

Ethics

Tutorial Questions and Readings

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Overview

The ethics option falls somewhat neatly into normative ethics and meta-ethics. We'll spend four sessions on the first, three sessions on the second, and one on a topic of your choice, either in normative or meta-ethics.

I'll generally follow the big debates: the normative ethics part is organised around the triptychon of consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics; while the meta-ethics part of the tutorials works its way through a version of the popular "family tree" of meta-ethical positions. This should prepare you well for exams, but also give you a very good position to start exploring off the beaten tracks. You should feel free, however, to propose topics which particularly interest you—indeed, I require you to do so for our last week.

Organisation

We will meet in eight tutorials, and you will need to write an essay for each. In tutorial groups of more than one student, we will set up a system in which one student presents their essay, while the other gives a critical response in a rotating scheme—we will organise this before tutorials start.

Literature

I expect you to read the literature I mark as "primary". The secondary literature is for suggestions and usually helps to deepen your knowledge. Some weeks are organised a bit more liberally, and require you to partially pick readings for yourself from a list of suggestions.

Feel free, in addition, to look at whatever other literature catches your fancy. If there are specific articles or books you wish to focus on, say so and I'll see how we can modify the topic or essay question. Everything goes, as long as I think that it has instructive and philosophical value.

In general, your initiative is always welcome. You will find that you're often the best philosopher in topics which interest you the most; so I'm happy to adjust to what interests you.

General Readings

Some general works you might consider to read before the tutorial starts are the following,

Kagan, Shelly. *Normative Ethics* (1998). (General overview, highly recommended.)

Kamm, Frances. *Intricate Ethics* (2007).

Driver, Julia. *Consequentialism* (2012).

Hursthouse, Rosalind. *On Virtue Ethics* (1999). (These are, in turn, excellent books on deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics.)

Miller, Alexander. *An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics* (2003). (As title says.)

Smith, Michael. *The Moral Problem* (1994). (Famous work in metaethics.)

For all topics we're dealing with, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides good introductory articles (on some topics even several). I will not generally list them amongst the readings, but presume that you can chase them up yourself if you want an introduction to the topics.

Deadlines

You will be required to send your essay to me before 10 am the day before the tutorial. (E.g., if your tutorial is on Monday, send it to me Sunday 10 am at the latest.)

Please raise all difficulties and problems you have with your essay as soon as possible. If I do not receive your essay on time, I might not read it. If your essays reach me repeatedly late or not at all without reasonable excuse, other disciplinary steps might follow.

Please send all essays by email, in a Word-compatible format (.doc, .docx, or .rtf), to the email address given above. Please do not send me PDF documents, as I can not annotate them conveniently.

Comments

I will usually provide written feedback for your essays. I tend to write lots of comments, but the quantity of my comments says nothing about the quality of your essay: even excellent essays will receive a lot. Furthermore, my main aim is to help you improve your essays. So more than 90% of my comments will be criticisms, questions or suggestions.

Always talk to me if you feel you don't understand my comments. Rewriting your essay can be one of the best things you can do to improve. Also, try to answer for yourself all questions I ask in my comments. If you are confident you can answer them well, you're usually on a good track.

Feedback

I will not give tentative grades for your papers, though I will aim to provide you with clear and helpful feedback on your progress. Please raise any issues you have with my teaching or the topics we are dealing with immediately so that I can do better.

Week 1. Consequentialism

Essay Question

What is the best form of consequentialism?

OR What is the strongest objection against consequentialism?

Remarks

We will start with a view you should be acquainted with from your first year, consequentialism. For this reason, the tutorial question gives you lots of leeway. As you might already know, there are lots of forms that consequentialism can take—e.g., act- versus rule-consequentialism, subjective versus objective consequentialism, and maximising versus satisficing consequentialism. Hooker's paper, or the SEP article on consequentialism, can give you an overview of this variety. Alternatively, you can write a more critical essay, focussing on objections to consequentialism. (The two questions are closely intertwined, of course.)

I expect some initiative on your part—to pick the readings you yourself find most pertinent to your essay. Readings in both sections are roughly sorted from more important to less important.

Introductory Readings

Hooker, Brad. "Consequentialism" (2010). In *The Routledge Companion to Ethics*, edited by John Skorupski, 444–55. ([Succinct overview of the main forms of consequentialism.](#))

Driver, Julia. *Consequentialism* (2012). ([Excellent overview.](#))

Readings: Forms of Consequentialism

Railton, Peter. "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 13.2 (1984): 134–71. ([Defends and explains the psychology of the "sophisticated" act-consequentialist.](#))

Hooker, Brad. *Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality* (2000). ([Influential revival of rule-consequentialism.](#))

Jackson, Frank. "Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection." *Ethics* 101.3 (1991): 461–82. ([Defends subjective consequentialism.](#))

Slote, Michael. "Satisficing Consequentialism." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes* 58 (1984): 139–63. ([A consequentialism which is based on doing "well enough", instead of maximising.](#))

Kagan, Shelly. "Evaluative Focal Points" (2000). In *Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader*, edited by Elinor Mason, Dale Miller, and Brad Hooker. ([Discusses and favours a version of consequentialism that doesn't prioritise any particular "evaluative focal point".](#))

Sen, Amartya. "Rights and Agency." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 11.1 (1982): 3–39. ([Advocates a very broad, agent-relative form of "consequential evaluation".](#))

Readings: Objections to Consequentialism

Williams, Bernard. "A Critique of Utilitarianism" (1973). In *Utilitarianism: For and against*, by J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams. (Offers a classic set of objections, including the "integrity" objection. Strongly recommended if you haven't looked at it already.)

Mulgan, Tim. *The Demands of Consequentialism* (2001). Chapter 2. (Explains the demandingness objection and possible replies.)

Foot, Philippa. "Utilitarianism and the Virtues." *Mind* 94 (1985): 196–209. (An early, influential criticism of consequentialism.)

Kapur, Neera Badhwar. "Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship." *Ethics* 101.3 (1991): 483–504. (A version of the "friendship" objection.)

Lenman, James. "Consequentialism and Cluelessness." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 29.4 (2000): 342–70. (An objection from impracticability.)

Examples of Past Exam Questions

- EITHER (a) Must consequentialism misunderstand the value of close personal relations? OR (b) 'Consequentialism can make no sense of excusable wrongs, so consequentialism is false.' Discuss. (2012)
- EITHER (a) Can it ever be morally right to bring about a worse rather than a better state of affairs? OR (b) Can a utilitarian be a good friend? Does it matter whether or not she can? (2011)
- EITHER 'Consequentialism is a good theory for bureaucratic planners, but unless every aspect of life should be bureaucratically planned, it cannot be a good ethical theory.' Discuss. OR 'Unless we are to be allowed to rewrite our moral duties to suit our convenience, there can be no truth in the claim that consequentialism is too demanding.' Discuss. (2010)

Week 2. Kant: Introduction and Good Will

Essay Question

What does Kant mean by the claim that only acting out of duty has moral worth? Is he correct?

Remarks

In this week and the next, we will look at Kant's ethics, which is often seen to provide the major alternative to consequentialism. We will approach the topic through a close reading of Kant's major work in ethics, and perhaps the single most important book in ethics, the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*—alternatively known by its preferred English title, the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785). Our focus this week will be on the first section of the book, while next week we focus on the second. We will also use this week's tutorial for a more general introduction to Kant's moral thought, and the differences between consequentialism and deontology, so please do not prepare too narrowly for this week.

You should obtain a copy of Kant's *Groundwork*, which will be the central work of this week and the next. I recommend Mary Gregor's translation in *Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), which tends to be the most precise. An alternative is Paton's older translation published under the awful title *The Moral Law*. The Meiner Verlag provides an excellently edited version of the German original. You should read the entire book, it's relatively short. The *Groundwork* is an exceptionally dense and difficult work, so you should go over it carefully and slowly, and read crucial passages more than once.

Historical authors tend to have their own ways of being referenced, and Kant is no exception. It is common to cite most of Kant's texts, including the *Groundwork*, after page numbers from the so-called Academy edition of his works.* For example, the Humanity formula of the categorical imperative can be found in volume 4, page 429 of this edition. A short citation would thus be "GMS [abbreviation for *Grundlegung*] 429" or "AA [abbr. for academy edition] 4:429". Good editions of Kant, such as the CUP version, will give you the original paginations.

General Recommendations

The following books are useful general resources when working on Kant:

Timmermann, Jens. *Kants' Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary* (2007). (A thorough, section-by-section commentary on the *Groundwork*.)

Schönecker, Dieter, and Allen Wood. *Immanuel Kant, "Grundlegung Zur Metaphysik Der Sitten": Ein Einführender Kommentar*. 2nd ed. (2007). (Unfortunately only available in German, but the best stand-alone introduction to the *Groundwork*.)

Korsgaard, Christine. *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (1996). (A selection of justly famous exegetical articles on the *Groundwork*.)

Wood, Allen. *Kantian Ethics* (2008). (Wood is an engaging writer who is especially concerned with dispelling misunderstandings about the *Groundwork*.)

Primary Readings

Kant, *Groundwork*. (For this week, read the entire book with a special focus on sec. I.)

Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (1996). Chapter 1. (Use this for a general introduction to Kant's practical thought.)

Wolf, Susan. "Moral Saints." *Journal of Philosophy* 79.8 (1982): 419–39.

Baron, Marcia. "The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting from Duty." *Journal of Philosophy* 81.4 (1984): 197–220. (These two articles will

* If you're capable of German, you can find a version of the Academy edition online at <http://www.korpora.org/kant/>, though modern print editions are preferable.

help you get started on what might be at issue in section 1 of the groundwork.)

Secondary Readings

Kamm, Frances. *Intricate Ethics* (2007). Chapter 1, “Nonconsequentialism”. (An analytically precise, contemporary statement of the core tenets of deontological ethics. Read if you have the time.)

Herman, Barbara. “On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty.” *Philosophical Review* 90.3 (1981): 359–382.

Langton, Rae. “Duty and Desolation.” *Philosophy* 67 (1992): 481-505. (These two articles continue the debate from Wolf and Baron. Langton’s article in particular I recommend.)

Timmermann, Jens. “Acting from duty: inclination, reason and moral worth”. In *Kant’s Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals: a critical guide* (2009), edited by Jens Timmermann, 45-62. (Timmermann, in general, is an excellent Kant commentator.)

Ross, W. D. *The Right and the Good* (2009 [1930]). (An influential non-Kantian form of deontology.)

Examples of Past Exam Questions

- ‘It is impossible to think of anything in the world ... that could be considered good without qualification except a good will.’ (KANT) Is this true? What would it show if it were? (2009)
- Explain and evaluate Kant’s view that a benevolent action done from inclination, ‘however it may conform with duty and however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth’. (2006)
- ‘Nothing in the world can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a *good will*’ (KANT). Elucidate and discuss. (2000)

Week 3. Kant: Categorical Imperative

Essay Question

What is the best formulation of the categorical imperative? Does it succeed as the supreme principle of morality?

Remarks

We will continue our exploration of Kant; this week we’ll focus on what Kant is most famous for, his categorical imperative. On closer inspection, Kant provides three formulations of the categorical imperative, claiming that they come to the same. There are many difficult questions of interpretation with regard to each formulation (even identifying what they are!), and their connection to each other. To cut this complexity down to a manageable level, you should focus in your essay on only one formulation, though we will discuss the others in the tutorial as well.

Reading is again structured in a general and a special part. You should start from the general readings, and then make your view to a

selection of your own from the specific readings to suit your tutorial essay.

General Readings

Kant, *Groundwork*. Section 2.

Wood, Allen. "Kant's Formulations of the Moral Law." In *A Companion to Kant* (2006), edited by Graham Bird.

Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (1996). Chapter 3, "Kant's Formula of Universal Law". Chapter 4, "Formula of Humanity".

Specific Readings

(1) Formula of Universal Law

O'Neill, Onora. *Constructions of Reason* (1989). Chapter 5, "Consistency in Action".

Parfit, Derek. *On What Matters* (2011). Chapter 12, "Universal Laws".

Mackie, J. L. "Three Stages of Universalization." In *Persons and Values* (1985).

(2) Formula of Humanity

Herman, Barbara. "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons." *Ethics* 94.4 (1984): 577–602.

O'Neill, Onora. *Constructions of Reason* (1989). Chapter 7, "Universal laws and ends-in-themselves".

Hill, Thomas. "Humanity as an End in Itself." *Ethics* 91.1 (1980): 84–99.

Parfit, Derek. *On What Matters* (2011). Chapters 9 and 10.

(3) Formula of Autonomy/Kingdom of Ends

Wood, Allen. *Kant's Ethical Thought* (1999). Chapter 5, "The formula of autonomy and the realm of ends".

Rawls, John. *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy* (2000). "The Categorical Imperative: The Third Formulation" (p. 200-216).

Flikschuh, Katrin. "Kant's kingdom of ends: metaphysical, not political". In *Kant's Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals: a critical guide* (2009), edited by Jens Timmermann, 119-139.

Examples of Past Exam Questions

- EITHER (a) 'In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity.' (KANT) Is this true? What would follow if it were true? OR (b) Is it morally permissible for me to act on the maxim 'I will buy clothes but not sell them'? What are the implications of this for Kant's moral theory? (2011)
- Should we be persuaded by Kant's arguments for the wrongfulness of suicide? (2009)
- 'I have taken Kant's categorical imperative as my norm, I did long ago. I have ordered my life by that imperative.' (EICHMANN) Sometimes known as 'The Architect of the Holocaust', Eichmann facilitated millions of murders. Could he yet have been a genuine Kantian? (2008)

Week 4. Virtue Ethics

Essay Question

Can we use virtue ethics to guide our behaviour? How?

OR Do both consequentialism and deontology go wrong in ignoring the primacy of character?

Remarks

Deontology/Kantian views and consequentialism/utilitarianism long seemed the two dominant alternatives in normative ethics. But a view which is older than both, virtue ethics, has over the last decades regained adherents. Virtue ethics emphasises the importance of agents, and is less focussed than the other two views on particular actions.

We'll also use this week to wrap up normative ethics (unless you want to return to it in week 8). So we'll discuss the "landscape" of normative ethics a bit: what are the differences between the three big views? In which area does one of the three have an advantage over the other? Or do these views just "climb the same mountain from different sides", as Derek Parfit has claimed?

Primary Readings

Stocker, Michael. "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories." *Journal of Philosophy* 73.14 (1976): 453–66. (Can also be read usefully with Anscombe's article.)

Hursthouse, Rosalind. *On Virtue Ethics* (1999). Recommended: Chapters 1, 5-6, 8. (We'll use Hursthouse's modern version of virtue ethics as our main focus. If you wish to concentrate on a more classical work, you can look Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* as the primary text instead. In that case, focus on)

Johnson, Robert. "Virtue and Right." *Ethics* 113.4 (2003): 810–34. (Describes a well-known problem for virtue ethics.)

Annas, Julia. "Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing." *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 78.2 (2004): 61–75. (A suggestion for a solution.)

Secondary Readings

Swanton, Christine. *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View* (2003).

Foot, Philippa. *Virtues and Vices* (2002). (Two other, influential statements of virtue ethics.)

van Zyl, Liezl. "Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent." *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 28.1 (2011): 80–92.

Anscombe, G. E. M. "Modern Moral Philosophy." *Philosophy* 33. 124 (1958): 1–19. (Anscombe's article was one reason that interest in virtue ethics was re-invigorated.)

McDowell, John. "Virtue and Reason." In *Mind, Value, and Reality* (1998), 50–75.

Crisp, Roger. "A Third Method of Ethics?" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 2012. (An attempt to locate virtue ethics in comparison to its opponents.)

Examples of Past Exam Questions

- EITHER 'The problem with "virtue ethics" is that it's not interested enough in what it is to be imperfectly virtuous.' Discuss. OR 'Being morally good and being excellent of one's kind are two quite different things, so "virtue ethics" cannot possibly tell us anything about moral goodness.' Discuss. (2012)
- 'Someone who withstands frightening things and does so cheerfully, or anyway without distress, is a courageous person, while someone who is distressed at them is cowardly.' (ARISTOTLE) Discuss. (2011)
- EITHER Is it more truly virtuous to be tempted to do wrong and successfully resist the temptation, or not to be tempted at all? OR 'It can be no objection to virtue ethics that it does not yield a credible criterion of right action, as it was never intended to do so.' Discuss. (2010)

Week 5. Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism

Essay Question

What is non-cognitivism? What is the Frege-Geach problem? Can non-cognitivism answer it?

Remarks

In this week, our focus shifts away from normative ethics to metaethics. In metaethics we ask second-order questions about ethics; so the questions and methods prevalent in this area are significantly different from what we have done so far. A helpful textbook in this area is Alexander Miller's *An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics* (2003). Russ Shafer-Landau's book *Moral Realism* (2003) also covers lots of ground and can be used as an excellent introduction. Michael Smith's *The Moral Problem* (1994) is a famous work in meta-ethics and also covers some of the topics we'll tend to sideline.

More so than in normative ethics, it's crucial in metaethics to be precise in how one understands central terms (e.g., non-cognitivism, expressivism, quasi-realism). So in this essay and the next two, an important part of your essay will be to clarify what the essay question is about in the first place.

We'll kick off meta-ethics by discussing the cognitivism—non-cognitivism debate. In structuring this tutorial and the next two, I'll follow a common way of organising the main position in metaethics as a "family tree".* So next week and the week after that we'll move

* You can get versions of this tree from, for example, Miller, *Introduction to Metaethics*, p. 8, or from Parfit, *On What Matters*, section 82.

down the tree towards more specific positions. This week we'll start with noncognitivism.

Non-cognitivists claim that moral claims do not express beliefs, but rather desires or other mental pro-attitudes. On Ayer's extreme version of the view, claims about ethics are thus strictly speaking meaningless. Blackburn's "quasi-realism" is more conciliatory, trying to gain the right to use all kinds of realist-sounding language while holding on to a fundamentally non-cognitivist story.

Primary Readings

Brink, David. *Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics* (1989). Chapter 2, "Moral realism and moral inquiry". (Read this as a general introduction into the different theories of metaethics; as an alternative, look at Miller's book.)

Ayer, A. J. *Language, Truth, and Logic* (1946 [1936]). Chapter 6, "Critique of Ethics and Theology".

Blackburn, Simon. *Spreading the Word* (1984). Sections 6.1, 6.2 (181-196).

Schroeder, Mark. "What is the Frege-Geach Problem?" *Philosophy Compass* 3.4 (2008): 703–720.

Secondary Readings

Blackburn, Simon. *Essays in Quasi-Realism* (1993). Chapter 9, "How to be an ethical anti-realist".

Zangwill, Nick. "Moral Modus Ponens." *Ratio* 5.2 (1992): 177–193.

Miller, *Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics*, chapter 4.

Dreier, James. "Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement." *Philosophical Perspectives* 23.1 (2009): 79–110.

Dreier, James. "Meta-Ethics and The Problem of Creeping Minimalism." *Philosophical Perspectives* 18.1 (2004): 23–44.

Smith, Michael. *The Moral Problem* (1993). Chapter 2, "The Expressivist Challenge".

Examples of Past Exam Questions

- 'If there is no truth in morality, there can be no rational moral arguments.' Discuss. (2011)
- Could there be genuine disputes about moral questions, if moral statements are neither true nor false? (2009)
- Can a non-cognitivist maintain that there is sometimes reason to act contrary to one's desires? (2008)

Week 6. Realism and Anti-Realism

Essay Question

Are there any mind-independent moral facts?

Remarks

We've discussed non-cognitivism in the last tutorial. We now turn to cognitivist theories of which there is also a wide range. Arguably, error theorists, constructivists, and moral realists are all cognitivists, even though the details of their view greatly differ. The readings for this week give you some taste of each of these theories. We can also discuss relativism, which is why I've included Harman amongst the readings.

The tutorial question is quite general—please do not use it as an excuse to comment on everything. Rather, try to defend a clear answer (“yes” or “no”) with a specific claim.

Primary Readings

Mackie, John. *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (1977). Chapter 1.

Enoch, David. *Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism* (2011). Chapter 3.

Street, Sharon. “What Is Constructivism in Ethics and Meta-Ethics?” *Philosophy Compass*, 2009.

Harman, Gilbert. “Moral Relativism Defended.” *Philosophical Review* 84.1 (1975): 3–22.

Secondary Readings

Joyce, Richard. *The Myth of Morality* (2001). Chapters 1, 8.

Shafer-Landau, Russ. *Moral Realism: A Defence* (2003). Chapter 2.

Railton, Peter. “Moral Realism.” *Philosophical Review* 95.2 (1986): 163–207.

Street, Sharon. “Constructivism about Reasons.” In *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* (2008), edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, vol. 3, 207–46.

Examples of Past Exam Questions

- EITHER ‘Since people have irresolvable moral disagreements, we should not believe that there are any objective moral facts.’ Do you agree? OR ‘Since beliefs don’t motivate but moral judgments necessarily do, moral realism is false.’ Is this a good argument? (2011)
- Can an error theorist who denies there are objective moral values continue to engage wholeheartedly in moral discourse? (2010)
- ‘The best explanation of our judgment that a given action is wrong need not cite any moral facts. Therefore, we have no reason to postulate moral facts.’ Is this a good argument against moral realism? (2010)
- Is the wrongness of slavery something we have discovered or something we have invented? (2008)

Week 7. Naturalism and Non-Naturalism

Essay Question

What does it mean to reduce the moral to the natural? Could reductionists ever account for the uniquely normative force of the moral?

OR If moral properties are non-natural, how can we know anything about them?

Remarks

Assume you believe that there are moral facts—i.e., you're at least a cognitivist and some kind of realist. Now we face another big question: how does the moral relate to the natural? Where, in Frank Jackson's words, is the "location" of the moral? This question is all the more pressing given that we believe that the moral supervenes on the natural: that is, we think that if two cases are exactly alike in their natural properties, then they cannot differ in their moral properties.

The question raises many difficult questions—e.g., about the nature of reduction and supervenience. The first question invites you to consider these. The second question focusses specifically on non-naturalism. For this question, you will want to look at the books by Audi and Huemer.

Primary Readings

Moore, G. E. *Principia Ethica* (1993 [1903]). Chapter 1, §§1-14.

Parfit, Derek. *On What Matters* (2011). Sections 82, 87, 88, 90.

Shafer-Landau, *Moral Realism*. Chapter 3, "Ethical Non-naturalism".

Jackson, Frank. *From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis* (2000). Chapter 5, "The Location Problem for Ethics".

Brink, *Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics*, sections 6.1-6.6 (p. 144-167).

Secondary Readings

Schroeder, Mark. "Realism and Reduction: The Quest for Robustness." *Philosophers' Imprint* 5.1 (2005).

Wedgwood, *Nature of Normativity*, chapter 9.

Cuneo, Terence. "Recent Faces of Moral Nonnaturalism." *Philosophy Compass* 2. 6 (2007): 850–79.

Audi, Robert. *The Good in the Right* (2004).

Huemer, Michael. *Ethical Intuitionism* (2005).

Examples of Past Exam Questions

- 'The only intelligible way of relating moral properties to natural properties is to reduce the former to the latter.' Discuss. (2012)
- 'If "good" means the same as "pleasant", the question "Are pleasant things good?" would mean the same as "Are pleasant things pleasant?". But these questions differ in meaning. So, "good" does not mean the same as "pleasant".' Is this a good argument against naturalism? (2011)

- What is the best explanation of the way in which moral properties might 'supervene' on natural properties? (2009)

Week 8. [Tbd]

The topic of this week will depend on your interests. Possible topics could be (for example): well-being, moral motivation, moral contractualism, moral epistemology, Trolley cases, or the intending/foreseeing distinction. Please tell me which topic you wish to tackle before or on week 4.