WELCOME

Advanced Introduction to Philosophy

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Aims of this Course

- Ease your way into the MA programme
- Give you some basic knowledge in modern, analytic, practical philosophy
- Give you a “feel” for that style of philosophy
- Get you started on reading and doing philosophy on your own
- Help you to avoid misconceptions about philosophy

Seminar Structure

Tuesday 4. 10.	Wednesday 5. 10.	Thursday 6. 10.	Friday 7. 10.
MORNING			
Philosophy Gettier & Logic Exercise	Normative Ethics	Political Philosophy Encountering New Arguments	Philosophy of Economics Criticising a Text (Friedman)
AFTERNOON			
Applied Ethics Text Re-construction (Thomson)	Metaethics Argument Re-construction (Mackie)	Philosophy of Science Argument Re-construction (Laudan)	Anything Else Presenting a New Argument

PHILOSOPHY

Session 1

Contents

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

1. The Rise of Modern Science

- Many of the central insights in physics, chemistry, biology, etc. were developed in the early decades of the 20th century
- Especially: Special relativity (1905), General Relativity (1916)

Effects

- Analytic philosophers were deeply impressed by the success of the sciences
- Metaphysics and other, “older” styles of philosophy looked outdated and mysterious

2. The Rise of Modern Logic

- New developments by Frege and others allowed a rigorous statement of propositional logic for the first time
- Logicism: reducing mathematics to logic

Effects

- Philosophy gains in clarity
- The new forms of logic provide a new way of analysing old philosophical problems

3. The Linguistic Turn

- Turning away from metaphysical and epistemological issues
- A growing interest in ideal languages, and analysing ordinary language

Effects

- Philosophy becomes primarily focussed on language

Features of Analytic Philosophy

- Analytic philosophy is not a commitment to any particular content, but a style of doing philosophy:
  - being aware of the limitations and confusions of language
  - trying to be clear and explicit in arguments
  - being cautious about metaphysical speculation gone wild
  - using formal logic as a tool
  - looking to the natural sciences for a model of rational discourse

Diverging Paths

- Analytic philosophy is set apart from many other philosophical traditions which developed at the same time, and which were less obsessed with language, logic and science
- One can distinguish, in very broad strokes, continental philosophy from analytic philosophy
  - the content and usefulness of these labels are controversial
  - the distinction is vague
  - the distinction might even be pernicious (Brian Leiter)
  - still, the distinction points to a *sociological* difference which is alive to this very day
  - (it's similar to "left" and "right")

A Comparison

Analytic Philosophy	Continental Philosophy
originates in the UK/Germany/Austria, dominant in the Anglo-Saxon world	originates in Continental Europe, especially France
takes the sciences as the paradigm for good philosophy	pays closer attention to literature and the arts
focusses on clarity and exactness in language, often using formal logic	is often written in a less rigid way, with little “formal” work
authoritative figures: Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, Frege, Carnap, etc.	authoritative figures: Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Gadamer, etc.
encompasses all topics, but includes highly abstract, practice-removed philosophical theorising	encompasses all topics, but tends to be more focussed on cultural, political, and social issues
of little influence in other humanities subjects, but influential in some of the sciences; rarely publicly recognised	often dominant in (e.g.) English, cult. studies departments & public culture more generally

PHILOSOPHICAL TOOLS

Intro

One of the most important things you can do to become a better philosopher (and person) is to learn logic

- introductory: Volker Halbach, *The Logic Manual*
- advanced: Ted Sider, *Logic for Philosophy*





1. **Necessary and Sufficient Conditions**
2. Arguments
3. Definitions

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

- A is a necessary condition for B: $B \rightarrow A$
  - if something is B, it must be/is A
  - this implies: if something is not-A, it's not-B
- A is a sufficient condition for B: $A \rightarrow B$
  - if something is A, it must be/is B
  - this implies: if something is not-B, it's not-A

Necessary and Sufficient, cont.

	Sufficient	Not sufficient
Necessary	➢ Sam is a father › Sam is a male parent ➢ It is Saturday or Sunday › It is the weekend	➢ Sam is male › Sam is a father ➢ The table has four sides › the table is square
Not necessary	➢ Sam is a father › Sam is male ➢ It rains › Earth gets wet	➢ John loves Pamela › Pamela loves John ➢ Being the smartest student › Getting the highest grade

Mostly taken from http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/conditions1.htm

Exercise

Decide for each of the following: true or false?

1. x's being less than 20 is a sufficient condition for x's being less than 12.
2. x's being less than 20 is a necessary condition for x's being less than 12.
3. x's having two arms is a sufficient condition for x's being a human being.
4. x's having two arms is a necessary condition for x's being a human being.
5. x's wanting to do *a* is a sufficient condition for x's doing *a*.
6. x's wanting to do *a* is a necessary condition for x's doing *a*.
7. x's being an equilateral rectangle is a sufficient condition for x's being a square.
8. x's being an equilateral rectangle is a necessary condition for x's being a square.

Taken from http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/conditions2.htm

Exercise

Decide for each whether (a) is necessary or sufficient (or both) for (b)

1. (a) x is blue.
   (b) x is colored.
2. (a) Alice's daughter is married.
   (b) Alice is a parent.
3. (a) Mike is driving a car.
   (b) Mike owns a car.
4. (a) Everybody loves somebody.
   (b) There is one person who is loved by everyone.
5. (a) All women pay taxes.
   (b) Anyone who does not pay taxes is not a woman.
6. (a) It is Tuesday or Wednesday.
   (b) It is Tuesday.

Taken from http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/conditions4.htm

Exercise

How can we reconstruct Gettier's text in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions?

The Problem

S knows that p if and only if (iff) _____ .

- This claim can be split into two logically separate claims:
  - Necessary Condition:

    If S knows that p, then _____ .
  - Sufficient Condition:

    If _____ , then S knows that p

Justified True Belief

- Some philosophers have completed the sentence in the following way:

  (JTP) S knows that p iff

  (1) p, and

  (2) S believes that p, and

  (3) S is justified in believing that p.

- **Exercise**: Consider theories which contain only subsets of (1), (2), and (3). Would they be good definitions?
- **Exercise**: Are all of (1)-(3) necessary for knowledge?

Arguing Against (JTP)

- Gettier's strategy: give counter-examples
  - Because (JTP) claims (implicitly) to apply to all actual and possible cases of knowledge, we only need to find *one* convincing case which contradicts (JTP)
- There are two ways to show (JTP) to be wrong:
  - argue against necessity

    there is a case where S knows that p, but where (1)-(3) are not true
  - argue against sufficiency

    there is a case where (1)-(3) are true, but S does not know p.

Gettier's Counterexample

- S = Smith, p = "The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket"
- The right-hand side of (JTP) is true:
  - (1) p. (Smith, the man who will get the job, has ten coins in his pocket)
  - (2) S believes that p.
  - (3) S is justified in believing that p.

    (Smith believes, and is justified in believing, that (a) Jones will get the job, (b) Jones has ten coins in his pockets, and therefore p.)
- But, Gettier argues, S does not know that p.

1. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
2. **Arguments**
3. Definitions

Arguments

- An argument consists of a set of premises and a (set of) conclusion(s)
- For example,

(1) If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll.
(2) We charge high fees for university.
Therefore, (3) only the rich will enroll. (from 1, 2)
(4) Universities should grant equal access to everyone.
(5) If only the rich enroll, there is no equal access to everyone.
Thus, (6) we should not charge high fees for university. (from 3, 4, 5)

Validity and Soundness

(1) If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll.
(2) We charge high fees for university.
(3) Therefore, only the rich will enroll. (from 1, 2)

- An argument is **valid** just in case the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusions (whether or not the premises are actually true)

Validity and Soundness

(1) Nicholas Cage is a unicorn.

(2) All unicorns have horns.

Thus, (3) Nicholas Cage has a horn.

- This argument is **valid**:

  Ua

  $\forall x(Ux \rightarrow Hx)$

  Ha

- However, this argument is **not sound**, because (1) is false
- An argument is sound just in case (a) all its premises are true and (b) it is valid

Reconstructing an Argument: Galileo

Salviati: If we take two bodies whose natural speeds are different, it is clear that on uniting the two, the more rapid one will be partly retarded by the slower, and the slower will be somewhat hastened by the swifter. Do you not agree with me in this opinion?
Simplicio: You are unquestionably right.
Salviati: But if this is true, and if a large stone moves with a speed of, say, eight, while a smaller stone moves with a speed of four, then when they are united, the system will move with a speed of less than eight. Yet the two stones tied together make a stone larger than that which before moved with a speed of eight: hence the heavier body now moves with less speed than the lighter, an effect which is contrary to your supposition. Thus you see how, from the assumption that the heavier body moves faster than the lighter one, I can infer that the heavier body moves more slowly. […] And so, Simplicio, we must conclude therefore that large and small bodies move with the same speed, provided only that they are of the same specific gravity.
(Galileo, *Dialogue* 108)

- P1. If the light ball falls more slowly than the heavy ball, then it acts as a drag on the combined system, causing it to fall more slowly than the heavy ball alone.
- P2. But the combined system is itself a new, even heavier object that falls more quickly than the heavy ball alone.
- C1. The light ball does not fall more slowly (*modus tollens* , P1, P2).
- P3. If the light ball does not fall more slowly, then all objects fall at the same rate of speed regardless of their respective weights.
- C2. Galileo concludes that the only logical solution is for all objects to fall at the same rate of speed regardless of their respective weights (*modus ponens* , P3, C1).

From Bruce/Barbone, *Just the Arguments*

- There are ways to make argument structures explicit, which you can learn in logic
- Two basic ways of criticising arguments is by saying that they are invalid, or unsound
- Necessary and sufficient conditions are very simple tools to think through philosophical problems, but need to be mastered nevertheless

DEFINING AND DEFINITIONS

I recommend, and partially follow, the excellent essay by Norman Swartz, http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/definitions.htm

1. **Definitions**
2. Good Definitions
3. A Warning About Dictionaries
4. When Define?

Defining Words

- An important activity in philosophy is defining words
  - "Hespherus" $=_{df}$ "the Evening Star"
  - "a priori" $=_{df}$ "non-empirical"

"a priori" $=_{df}$ "non-empirical"

definiendum
(what is to be defined)

definiens
(what is giving the definition)

Kinds of Definitions

- Descriptive definition: spell out how a word is commonly used
- Stipulative definition: introduces a new word, or re-defines an existing word, in a manner the speaker sees fit
- Explicative definition: a mix of descriptive and stipulative definition. Makes an existing word more precise and/or introduces new elements, while also trying to do justice to existing usage

1. Definitions
2. **Good Definitions**
3. A Warning About Dictionaries
4. When Define?

Some Requirements for Good Definitions

- Non-Circularity: the definiens should not contain the definiendum
- Neutrality: a definition should not allow us to deduce new knowledge about facts
- More Clarity: the definition should provide an advantage in understanding the concept; it should not substitute less clear concepts
- Adequacy: central paradigm cases (as judged by competent speakers) should not be correctly classified

Exercise

Are the following good definitions?

pain = the opposite of pleasure

democracy = the system of government which produces the greatest good for the greatest number

justice = equality

human being = the only animal on earth capable of rational thought

Exercise

Are the following good arguments?

Are we allowed to always follow our self-interest?

Self-interest means what‘s in your best interest, in other words, the best thing you can do. So of course it‘s allowed!

Is there an external world?

“World” is simply the things out there, so it must be external, because external just means “out there”.

Is affirmative action just?

Justice is giving everyone an equal opportunity. Affirmative action doesn’t do so. Thus, affirmative action by definition is unjust.

1. Definitions
2. Good Definitions
3. **A Warning About Dictionaries**
4. When Define?

Dictionaries

- Dictionaries report how words are used
  - they are, at best, a guide to actual usage
  - the main function of dictionaries is to allow people to understand each other, and teach new words
  - they usually ignore complications and difficulties
- But ...
  - philosophers often have technical definitions and understandings of phrases which differ from how they are commonly used
  - dictionary definitions are rarely exact enough
- Rule of thumb: **never use** (non-specialist) **dictionaries for serious philosophical work**

Exercise

duty = a moral or legal obligation

existence = the fact or state of living or having objective reality

reality = the state of things as they actually exist, as opposed to an idealistic or notional idea of them

philosophy = the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence, especially when considered as an academic discipline

(All examples from oxforddictionaries.com)

Exercise

Justice, in its broadest context, includes both the attainment of that which is just and the philosophical discussion of that which is just.

A **game** is structured playing, usually undertaken for enjoyment and sometimes used as an educational tool.

Friendship is a relationship of mutual affection between two or more people.

A **state** is an organized community living under one government.

(All examples from english Wikipedia)

1. Definitions
2. Good Definitions
3. A Warning About Dictionaries
4. **When Define?**

Exercise

Gettier never defines “knowledge”, “justified”, etc.
Is this a problem for his view?

(A harder question: is giving necessary and sufficient conditions the same as giving a definition?)

When Give Definitions?

- Substantial philosophical problems cannot be “defined away”: they can merely be made more precise
- We know how to use many words, even without explicit definitions (“game”)
- **You cannot, and should not, define everything!**

- Give a definition if
  - a concept is central to your argument,
  - a concept is vague and confused,
  - different philosophers use the concept in different ways